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COPYRIGHT AS COMMUNITY PROPERTY
Introduction
In re Marriage of Worth' is the only reported case that has consid-
ered the effect of California's community property law on an author's
rights under the Copyright Act of 1976.2 In Worth, the California
Court of Appeal characterized a copyright as a community property
asset.3 The decision is significant because of the extensive volume of
copyrightable subject matter that is created and exploited in what is
considered the capital of the entertainment industry, California, a
community property state.4
Characterizing a copyright as community property not only will
affect spouses upon dissolution of a marriage but also will thwart the
efforts of an author to freely exploit his or her work.5 In addition,
licensees, entertainment attorneys, and others will feel the effects of
the characterization in the business practices involved in contract and
copyright administration.
Part I of this Article compares community property law and fed-
eral copyright law. Part II discusses the facts and holding of Worth.
Part III analyzes the Worth decision. Part IV proposes a solution that
applies both state community property law and federal copyright law
upon dissolution of marriage.
I
Differences Between Community Property Law and
Copyright Law
The Worth decision, by classifying a copyright as a community
property asset, implies that copyright law and community property
law can coexist without incident.6 In reality, there are significant dif-
1. In re Marriage of Worth, 241 Cal. Rptr. 135 (Ct. App. 1987).
2. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) [hereinafter Copyright Act].
3. Worth, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 140.
4. "California is the community property state from which emanates the largest vol-
ume of literary, artistic, cinematographic, computer, and other copyrightable works, [and
therefore] it is appropriate to focus on the community property law of California." David
Nimmer, Copyright Ownership by the Marital Community: Evaluating Worth, 36 UCLA L.
REV. 383, 388-89 (1988) (footnotes omitted).
5. One commentator has argued that "[t]he immediate effect of the Worth decision is
that in California, husbands and wives are the co-owners of copyrights in works created
during marriage, commencing with creation of such works." Michael J. Perlstein, Copy-
right as Community Property: Questions About Worth Are More than Merely Trivial, ErNr.
L. REP., Apr. 1988, at 3, 5.
6. Carla M. Roberts, Note, Worthy of Rejection: Copyright as Community Property,
100 YALE L.J. 1053 (1991).
The Worth decision purports to find no inconsistency in its application of federal
copyright law and California community property law. Instead, Worth provides a
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ferences between the two bodies of law, particularly in their grants of
rights to the author of a copyrightable work, that cast doubt on the
court's conclusion.
A. Ownership
The Copyright Act states that initial ownership of a copyright
vests in the author of the work.7 Community property law, on the
other hand, assumes that all property acquired during marriage by
either spouse is the property of both spouses. 8 This general presump-
tion undermines federal copyright law by characterizing a copyright
acquired during marriage as community property rather than the sole
property of the author spouse. This characterization under commu-
nity property law effectively makes author and non-author spouses co-
owners of the property right.
B. Co-Ownership Under Community Property Law Versus Joint
Ownership Under Federal Copyright Law
There are several critical distinctions between co-ownership
under community property law and joint ownership under the federal
Copyright Act. Under the Copyright Act, a single joint owner is pre-
cluded from assigning or exclusively licensing the work without the
written consent of the other joint owners.9 Although a joint owner
cannot convey an exclusive license in the work, he may, without ob-
taining the consent of the other joint owners, either exploit the work
personally or grant a nonexclusive license to a third party.10
Joint owners of a work may agree that no one of them shall have
the right to license the work without the consent of the others, and the
agreement will be enforced against any third-party licensee taking
with notice of the restriction.11 A joint owner who profits from per-
sonally using or licensing a work has a duty to account to the other
messy union of two bodies of law with distinct historical justifications and objec-
tives. This union hinders the goals of copyright law without substantially enhanc-
ing the goals of community property law.
Id. at 1056.
7. 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (1988).
8. CAL. FAM. CODE § 760 (Deering 1994) (revising former CAL. CIV. CODE § 5110).
The definition of community property used in the Worth case, as well as in this Article,
remains unchanged by § 760.
9. MARSHALL A. LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW 141 (1989).
10. Id. See also 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT
§ 6.10, at 6-28 (1994).
11. 1 HOWARD B. ABRAMS, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT § 4.04, at 4-40 (1993).
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joint owners for their proportionate share of the profits. 2 If one joint
owner dies, courts "treat the copyright as a tenancy in common, in
which the heirs or legatees accede to all the joint author's rights in the
corpus."'3
Under California community property law, a copyright is consid-
ered intangible personal property owned by the author and the non-
author spouse.' 4 California Family Code section 1100 grants both
spouses authority to manage and control community personal prop-
erty.' 5 Section 1100, then, would allow a non-author spouse to dis-
12. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 121 (1976). Co-owners of a copyright
would be treated generally as tenants in common, with each co-owner having an independ-
ent right to use or license the use of a work, subject to a duty of accounting to the other co-
owners for any profits. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 10, § 6.12, at 6-34.
13. Nimmer, supra note 4, at 394. Tenancy in common should be contrasted with the
doctrine of joint tenancy, under which death of a joint tenant results in passage of owner-
ship to the surviving joint tenant, not to the heirs of the deceased joint tenant. NIMMER &
NIMMER, supra note 10, § 6.09, at 6-27.
14. CAL. FAM. CODE § 760 (Deering 1994).
15. CAL. FAM. CODE § 1100 (revising CAL. CIV. CODE § 5125). That section states:
(a) [E]ither spouse has the management and control of the community per-
sonal property, whether acquired prior to or on or after January 1, 1975, with like
absolute power of disposition, other than testamentary, as the spouse has of the
separate estate of the spouse.
(b) A spouse may not make a gift of community personal property, or dis-
pose of community personal property for less than fair and 'reasonable value,
without the written consent of the other spouse. This subdivision does not apply
to gifts mutually given by both spouses to third parties and to gifts given by one
spouse to the other spouse ....
(d) Except as provided in subdivisions (b) and (c), and in Section 1102, a
spouse who is operating or managing a business or an interest in a business that is
all or substantially all community personal property has the primary management
and control of the business or interest. Primary management and control means
that the managing spouse may act alone in all transactions but shall give prior
written notice to the other spouse of any sale, lease, exchange, encumbrance, or
other disposition of all or substantially all of the personal property used in the
operation of the business ... whether or not title to that property is held in the
name of only one spouse. Written notice is not, however, required when prohib-
ited by the law otherwise applicable to the transaction.
Remedies for the failure by a managing spouse to give prior written notice as
required by this subdivision are only as specified in Section 1101. A failure to
give prior written notice shall not adversely affect the validity of a transaction nor
of any interest transferred.
(e) Each spouse shall act with respect to the other spouse in the manage-
ment and control of the community assets and liabilities in accordance with the
general rules governing fiduciary relationships which control the actions of per-
sons having relationships of personal confidence as specified in Section 721, until
such time as the assets and liabilities have been divided by the parties or by a
court. This duty includes the obligation to make full disclosure to the other
spouse of all material facts and information regarding the existence, characteriza-
tion, and valuation of all assets in which the community has or may have an inter-
est and debts for which the community is or may be liable, and to provide equal
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pose of the five exclusive rights granted to the owner of a copyright by
federal copyright law.16 A spouse may not, however, dispose of a
copyright 17 for less than fair and reasonable value without written
consent of the other spouse.18 Section 1100 is a broad grant of right
that gives the non-author spouse substantially more power and control
over the property than is afforded to a joint owner by the federal
Copyright Act.' 9
Despite the differences between federal copyright law and Cali-
fornia community property law, an exception to the equal manage-
ment rule z0 might produce a situation in which the two are actually
more in accord. Section 1100(d) provides that "a spouse who is oper-
ating or managing a business or an interest in a business that is all or
substantially all community personal property has the primary man-
agement and control of the business or interests."2 " If an author were
found to have primary management and control of an interest, which
in this context would be the exploitation of a copyright, that spouse
would be given the power to act alone in all transactions, but would be
required to give prior written notice and provide an accounting to the
non-author spouse."2 Under section 1100(d), the author, while not
having exclusive ownership rights under community property law,
would still retain the exclusive rights provided for in § 106 of the
Copyright Act.2 3. This resolution, of course, would require an initial
finding that the author spouse has primary management and control
of the interest.24
access to all information, records, and books that pertain to the value and charac-
ter of those assets and debts, upon request.
Id.
16. Id. § 1100(d). For an enumeration of these rights, see 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1988 &
Supp. V 1993).
17. Either spouse can exploit the copyright and its entire bundle of rights. See NIM-
MER & NIMMER, supra note 10, § 6.13[A][1], at 6-40.2.
18. CAL. FAM. CODE § 1100(b).
19. The grant of a nonexclusive license by a co-owner can have a significant negative
impact on the economic return of a particular work. As one commentator notes, "[m]ovie
producers generally do not want to invest millions in making a movie if they face competi-
tion from another nonexclusive licensee of the movie rights to a given novel." Roberts,
supra note 6, at 1058.
20. CAL. FAM. CODE § 1100(d).
21. Id.
22. Id. § 1100(d), (e).
23. One commentator suggests that "[i]n order to avoid chaos in the entertainment
industry, the author-spouse.., must be considered the spouse who has the 'primary man-
agement and control of the business on interest."' Perlstein, supra note 5, at 6.
24. Applying § 1100 to the copyright context,
it would appear to mean that a professional author has the right to sell or license
the copyright in his or her works, and that his or her spouse may not. But this
conclusion involves a determination of whether an author is a professional, i.e.,
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Even with this partial harmonization, California community
property law and federal copyright law still conflict. Ultimately, it ap-
pears that either federal preemption must be invoked, or courts must
develop a common law scheme to effect the goals of both community





The Worth case involved two trivia books written and published
by Frederick Worth during his marriage to Susan Worth.25 Their 1982
dissolution agreement stated that all royalties from the two books
would be divided equally between the spouses.2 6
In 1984 Frederick Worth filed a copyright infringement action in
federal court against the producers of the Trivial Pursuit board game,
alleging that some of the questions in the game were plagiarized from
whether he or she may be said to be 'operating or managing a business' which
consists of the copyrights in his or her works. For an author whose livelihood is
only partially derived from the marketing of creative works, this will present
some difficult gray areas.
NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 10, § 6.13[B], at 6-44.
25. In re Marriage of Worth, 241 Cal. Rptr. 135 (Ct. App. 1987). The first of Frederick
Worth's books was published in 1977, the second in 1981. Id. Because the Copyright Act
became effective on January 1, 1978, the second book was automatically given federal
copyright protection upon creation. Copyright in the second book would have been ac-
quired in 1981, or possibly before, if a written manuscript existed or if the expression were
fixed in some other medium. The 1977 book, on the other hand, would not have had
automatic protection under the 1909 Copyright Act. However, Section 303 of the Copy-
right Act states that a "fc]opyright in a work created before January 1, 1978, but not there-
tofore ... copyrighted, subsists from January 1, 1978, and endures for the term provided by
section 302 [life of the author plus fifty years]." 17 U.S.C. §§ 302, 303 (1988). This means
that if Frederick Worth did not have a federal copyright in the 1977 book, upon January 1,
1978, he was automatically vested with federal copyright protection. If he did have a copy-
right in 1977, then the copyright was acquired during the marriage. In that case, copyrights
for both books would have been acquired during the marriage. The Worth court character-
ized the copyrights as community property without stating when the copyrights were ac-
quired by Worth. In fact, the copyrights would have been either community property or
separate property, depending on the date of acquisition by Worth. Because Frederick and
Susan Worth's divorce decree is dated 1982, it is possible that the parties were living sepa-
rate and apart (within the meaning of Family Code § 771) at the time of acquisition of the
copyrights, particularly the copyright for the 1981 book. Section 771 states that "[tihe
earnings and accumulations of a spouse ... while living separate and apart from the other
spouse, are the separate property of the spouse." If so, the 1981 copyright would be Fred-
erick Worth's separate property.
26. In re Marriage of Worth, 241 Cal. Rptr. 135, 137 (Ct. App. 1987).
19951
his trivia books.27 Susan Worth then sought an order declaring that
she would be entitled to one-half of any proceeds from the infringe-
ment suit.2" The trial court granted Susan Worth's motion and Freder-
ick Worth appealed.29 The question before the court of appeal was
whether the marital community had an interest in the copyrights.3 °
B. The Court's Conclusion
The Worth court held that the marital community had an interest
in the copyrights, based on its finding that the copyrights granted to
Frederick Worth were divisible community property.31 Because the
assets were not disposed of upon dissolution, Frederick Worth and Su-
san Worth remained co-owners of an undivided interest in the copy-
rights, 32 and both were entitled to share equally in any proceeds
flowing from the federal lawsuit for copyright infringement. 33 The
Worth court also found no conflict between the federal Copyright Act
and California community property law that would lead the court to
invoke the preemption doctrine.34
27. Id. at 135. The trivia books can be considered literary works. Literary works are
"works, other than audiovisual works, expressed in words, numbers, or other verbal or
numerical symbols or indicia, regardless of the nature of the material objects, such as
books, periodicals, manuscripts, phonorecords, film, tapes, disks, or cards, in which they
are embodied." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). Literary works are a subject
matter of copyright and are given copyright protection upon being fixed in a tangible me-
dium of expression. Id. § 102.
28. Worth, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 135.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 136.
31. Id. at 138. Carla Roberts distinguishes between two elements of copyright owner-
ship: (1) the right to income from a copyright and (2) the right to control the disposition of
the copyright. Roberts, supra note 6, at 1053 n.3. According to Roberts, "Worth estab-
lished for the first time a community property interest in the control element," but she
argues "that it is appropriate to treat the right to income element as community property,
but that it is inappropriate ... to treat the control element as community property." Id.
32. Worth, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 140.
33. Id. During the pendency of this appeal, the federal district court ruled that Freder-
ick Worth had no claim of copyright infringement. Worth v. Selchow & Righter Co., 827 F.
2d 569, 574 (9th Cir. 1987).
34. Worth, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 140.
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In
Analysis of the Worth Decision
A. The Court's Discussion of Copyright Law
In a brief discussion of pertinent copyright law,35 the court recog-
nized that Congress is empowered to extend federal copyright protec-
tion to authors and that Congress has exercised this power through
enactment of the Copyright Act.36 The court also recognized that
§ 106 of the Copyright Act grants to the owner of a copyright certain
exclusive rights.37 In a suit for copyright infringement, the copyright
owner is entitled to injunctive relief,38 impoundment of infringing ma-
terial3 9 actual damages,4 0 and profits.41 The court noted that
although federal copyright protection is extended automatically upon
creation of a copyrightable work,42 registration and affixed notice are
required to bring an infringement suit.43
B. The Court's Discussion of Copyright as Community Property
1. Classification of the Books as Community Property
The Worth court found that "any artistic work created during
marriage ' '44 is community property under California community prop-
35. The court undertook a "brief odyssey into the somewhat arcane domain of copy-
right law." Id. at 136. It is not surprising that the court, after acknowledging copyright law
to be arcane, and then merely attempting to skim the surface of the subject, did not fully
appreciate or uphold an author's rights under copyright law.
36. Id.
37. Id. Section 106 states:
[Tihe owner of copyright ... has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of
the following: (1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work; (3) to dis-
tribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by sale or
other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending; (4) in the case of liter-
ary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, and motion pic-
tures and other audiovisual works, to perform the copyrighted work publicly; and
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the individual
images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to display the copyrighted
work publicly.
17 U.S.C. § 106 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
38. Worth, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 136. See 17 U.S.C. § 502.
39. Worth, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 136. See 17 U.S.C. § 503.
40. Worth, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 136. See 17 U.S.C. § 504.
41. 17 U.S.C. § 504.
42. Worth, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 136. A copyrightable work is one that meets the require-




erty law.45 Regardless of the fact that Frederick Worth was the sole
author of the trivia books, the court found the conclusion "ines-
capable" that the books were community property since they were
written during the term of the marriage.46
The court pointed out that community property principles do not
mandate that husband and wife expend equal efforts or make equal
contributions in acquiring property.47 "It is enough that the skill and
effort of one spouse expended during the marriage resulted in the cre-
ation or acquisition of a property interest. '48
The court, in finding the trivia books community property, also
gave considerable weight to the stipulated judgment between Freder-
ick and Susan Worth at the time of the interlocutory divorce decree.
The judgment was drafted by Frederick Worth's attorney and stated:
The parties agree that future royalties from the books.., listed
on the Petition, along with all reprints shall be paid equally to Peti-
tioner and Respondent. The parties agree that the literary agent for
Respondent shall be joined as a party and that the agent shall pay
directly to Petitioner her one-half interest in the royalties. The par-
ties agree that the court shall reserve jurisdiction over any issues
that may subsequently arise regarding the distinction between a re-
edition or complete reworking of any book which is community
property.49
From the reference in the divorce judgment to "any book which is
community property," the court concluded that the parties understood
and agreed that the two trivia books were community property.51
Also, the court interpreted Frederick Worth's decision to divide the
royalties equally as his acknowledgment that the books were commu-
nity property. 51 The Worth court concluded, in effect, that the books
were community property because of the parties' agreement. This
reasoning is incorrect. In fact, community property principles would
operate upon dissolution of marriage to give fifty percent of all prop-
erty acquired during marriage to Susan Worth, regardless of Frederick
Worth's stipulation.
45. CAL. FAM. CODE § 760 (Deering 1994).
46. Worth, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 136.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 136-37.
49. Id. at 137.
50. Id.
51. One commentator has argued that a fifty-fifty split such as the one in Worth is
likely to "be agreed to by any author spouse's attorney in any property settlement negotia-
tion-unless that attorney knew of Section 201(e) and argued that it precludes such a divi-
sion as to copyright interests." Francis M. Nevins, Jr., When An Author's Marriage Dies:
The Copyright-Divorce Connection, 37 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'y 382, 389 (1990). However,
"[tihe overwhelming majority of divorce lawyers know nothing of copyright and therefore
cannot conceive of such an argument." Id.
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2. Classification of the Copyrights as Community Property
After finding that the books were community property, the court
recognized that any rents, profits, income, or increase in value of com-
munity property would also be community property 52-including the
copyrights to the books. All related benefits, such as damages from
an infringement suit, would also be community property. 3
Both tangible and intangible property may be community prop-
erty according to the Worth court.54 "The fact that a copyright is in-
tangible will not affect its community character or the community
nature of any tangible benefits directly associated with the
copyright.'55
The court distinguished In re Marriage of Aufmuth,5 6 which held
that classification of a legal education as a community asset went
against community property principles, 7 because it would require the
division of attributable post-dissolution earnings, which, by definition,
constitute the separate property of the acquiring spouse.58 A copy-
right is distinguishable from a law degree in that "[a] copyright has a
present value based upon the ascertainable value of the underlying
artistic work. Its value normally would not depend on the postmarital
efforts of the authoring spouse but rather on the tangible benefits di-
rectly or indirectly associated with the literary product.
59
Despite this argument, it is unlikely that a script, song, or other
original work of authorship fixed in a tangible medium of expression
could shop itself around Hollywood. It is more probable that such a
work, though created during marriage, would require rewriting or
modification after dissolution to prepare it for commercial exploita-
tion. After dissolution these efforts would be attributed solely to the
author spouse60 and should be that spouse's separate property, not the
52. Worth, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 137.
53. Id. at 139.
54. Id. at 137.
55. Id. at 138.
56. Id. (citing In re Aufmuth, 152 Cal. Rptr. 668 (Ct. App. 1979)).
57. Aufmuth, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 677-78.
58. Property acquired during marriage is community property, but property acquired
after dissolution of marriage is the separate property of the earning spouse by virtue of the
fact that the community no longer exists. See CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 760, 771 (Deering 1994).
Upon dissolution of marriage the community terminates, and the non-acquiring spouse
should not be awarded a community interest in the value of the post-marital efforts of the
acquiring spouse.
59. Worth, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 138.
60. "The earnings and accumulations of a spouse and the minor children living with, or
in the custody of, the spouse, while living separate and apart from the other spouse, are the
separate property of the spouse." CAL. FAM. CODE § 771.
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property of the community. Under this analysis a copyright is argua-
bly indistinguishable from a law degree. Treating a copyright as a
community property asset would require division of attributable post-
dissolution earnings-which would run counter to community prop-
erty principles.6'
C. Vesting Versus Transfer
The Worth court avoided a serious discussion of the conflict be-
tween community property and copyright law regarding vesting of ti-
tle. Because all property acquired during marriage is presumed to be
community property, title of the copyright would automatically vest in
both spouses. However, this is in direct conflict with § 201(a) of the
Copyright Act, which states that a copyright vests initially in the au-
thor or authors of the work.62
The court implied that community property law does not conflict
with federal copyright law because the copyright can initially vest in
the author spouse under federal law and then can transfer to both
spouses by operation of California community property law.63 The
court seems to be implicating § 201(d)(1) of the Copyright Act,64
which provides for the transfer of copyright ownership. However,
§ 201(d)(1) appears to govern transfer only after initial ownership has
vested in the author. The Worth court, by applying the transfer provi-
sion of § 201(d)(1), effectively rendered meaningless the vesting re-
quirement of § 201(a).
Moreover, the court failed to explain why the federal Copyright
Act expressly provided for implied assignment of authorship to an
employer in § 201(b) but did not include a provision for implied as-
signment to a spouse.65 Section 201(b) of the Copyright Act carves
out an exception for vesting of initial ownership in the author by stat-
ing that
[i]n the case of a work made for hire, the employer or other person
for whom the work was prepared is considered the author for pur-
poses of this title, and, unless the parties have expressly agreed
otherwise in a written instrument signed by them, owns all of the
rights comprised in the copyright.66
Note that § 201(b) doesn't transfer ownership; it infers that there is an
implied agreement between the employer and employee that the em-
61. Id.
62. 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (1988).
63. Worth, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 139.
64. 17 U.S.C. § 201(d)(1).
65. See id. § 201(b).
66. Id.
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ployer is to be the "author. '67 This section is in line with the goals of
federal copyright protection because it still seeks to secure for the per-
son ultimately responsible for stimulating creativity "the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings." 6 An employer who pays an em-
ployee to create is rewarded for his investment and interest in creativ-
ity,69 while the true author can retain the copyright by express written
agreement of both parties.7 °
The ownership of copyright implied by the work for hire doctrine
is significantly different from implying a transfer of title by operation
of law. The transfer by operation of law does not allow the author to
reject the transfer of title; instead it represents a taking of the author's
copyright.71 The justifications for the vesting provision of § 201(b) do
not exist for an implied vesting in the non-author spouse.
The Worth court, relying on the transfer provision of § 201(d)(1),
did not consider that § 201(e) of the Copyright Act might overrule a
transfer by operation of state community property law.72 Section
201(e) states that if an author has not voluntarily transferred owner-
67. Id. Although by making the employer the "author," § 201(b) seems to work a
transfer by operation of law; it is not a transfer, but rather an immediate vesting in the
employer. Immediate vesting of title in the employer was expressly provided for by Con-
gress. If Congress had intended to create an exception to § 201(a) for vesting of title in
both author and non-author spouse, it would have done so by expressly providing for such
vesting in the Copyright Act, just as it vested ownership in the work for hire context.
Similarly, when Congress sought to protect the grandchildren, children, and widow or wid-
ower of the author, it did so expressly. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 203, 304 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
68. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
69. One commentator has argued that authorship for the employer is justified on the
following grounds: "(1) The work is produced on behalf of the employer and under his
direction; (2) The employee is paid for the work; and (3) The employer, since he pays all
the costs and bears all the risks of loss, should reap any gain." William Patry, Copyright
and Community Property: The Question of Preemption, 28 BULL. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y 237,
249 (1981).
70. Section 201(b) allows the parties to agree "otherwise" as to who "owns all rights
comprised in the copyright." 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (1988). There is implicit consent by the
author to assign his right. Nimmer, supra note 4, at 406.
71. David Nimmer asks whether "just as Congress cannot constitutionally deem an
employer automatically to be an 'author' absent at least an implied consent from the em-
ployee-author, so Congress lacks the authority to permit application of the community
property laws to copyright, which would in effect deem a spouse to be a co-author?" Nim-
mer, supra note 4, at 406.
72. Section 201(e) states:
When an individual author's ownership of a copyright, or of any of the exclusive
rights under a copyright, has not previously been transferred voluntarily by that
individual author, no action by any governmental body or other official or organi-
zation purporting to seize, expropriate, transfer, or exercise rights of ownership
with respect to the copyright, or any of the exclusive rights under a copyright,
shall be given effect under this title except as provided under Title 11
[Bankruptcy].
17 U.S.C. § 201(e) (1988).
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ship in the copyright or in any of the exclusive rights under the copy-
right, no action by any governmental body or other official or
organization purporting to transfer or exercise rights of ownership
with respect to the copyright, or any of the exclusive rights under the
copyright, shall be given effect.73
Here federal law seems to conflict with California's application of
community property law. Under federal copyright law, because the
author spouse did not previously transfer ownership voluntarily to the
non-author spouse, California community property law should not be
able to intervene to transfer title.74
D. Preemption
Federal copyright law clearly conflicts with California community
property law. The critical question is whether California law should
be preempted under the Supremacy Clause 75 or by a statutory provi-
sion of the federal Copyright Act. Section 301 of the Copyright Act
expressly addresses preemption of state law,76 and § 201(e) preempts
a transfer of copyright ownership by operation of state community
property law.77
1. The Court's Discussion of Preemption
Frederick Worth made two arguments in support of federal pre-
emption of California community property law. First, he argued that
because state community property law conflicted with the federal
Copyright Act, federal law should preempt state law under the
Supremacy Clause.78 The two bodies of law are in conflict, he pointed
out, because under California community property law both author
and non-author spouses have equal interests in the community prop-
73. Id. § 201(d)(1).
[B]y section 201(e)'s extension to domestic actions, it would appear that a divorce
or probate court in any state is disabled from awarding to a nonauthor spouse
interests in his or her author spouse's copyright involuntarily, for the award as an
enforceable state action would work an involuntary transfer within the meaning
of 201(e).
Patry, supra note 69, at 267.
74. The impact of § 201(e) on state domestic relations is clear to Nevins. "Since Janu-
ary 1, 1978, state courts have been precluded from involuntarily awarding any share of a
married author's copyrights to his or her non-author spouse as matrimonial property in a
divorce action." Nevins, supra note 51, at 383.
75. "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pur-
suance thereof ... shall be the supreme Law of the Land." U.S. CONST. art. V1, § 5.
76. See infra note 88.
77. 17 U.S.C. § 201(e).
78. In re Marriage of Worth, 241 Cal. Rptr. 135, 139 (Ct. App. 1987).
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erty; but under the Copyright Act, the copyright would vest only in
the author spouse.7 9
Frederick Worth relied on Hisquierdo8 ° and related cases81 to es-
tablish that previously, in community property states where there had
been a conflict between state and federal law, the state law had been
preempted.82 The court, however, concluded that in these cases the
federal benefits at issue were expressly defined by Congress to be the
separate property of the designated recipient.83 In the present case,
the federal Copyright Act did not expressly designate copyright own-
ership as the separate property of the author.84 Rather, the Act al-
lowed co-ownership of copyright and transfer of all or part of a
copyright interest.85 Furthermore, the court interpreted the Act as
stipulating that ownership only vests initially in the author86 and
found nothing in the Act that expressly "precludes the acquisition of a
community property interest by a [non-author] spouse, or which is
otherwise inconsistent with [California] community property law."87
Frederick Worth's second preemption argument was based on
§ 301 of the Copyright Act,88 which precludes a state from granting
any rights equivalent to the federal rights granted in § 106 of the
79. Id.
80. Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572 (1979). Even though Congress expressed a
policy different from the holding of Hisquierdo (by enacting statute 45 U.S.C. § 231m
(b)(2)), Hisquierdo still articulates the Supreme Court standard for assessing community
property preemption under the Supremacy Clause. Roberts, supra note 6, at 1061 n.59.
The standard in Hisquierdo is that "[sltate family and family-property law must do 'major
damage' to 'clear and substantial' federal interests before the Supremacy Clause will de-
mand that state law be overridden." 439 U.S. at 581 (quoting United States v. Yazell, 382
U.S. 341, 352 (1966)).
8!. McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210 (1981); Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663 (1962); Wiss-
ner v. Wissner, 338 U.S. 655 (1950).
82. In Hisquierdo federal law was found to preempt state law because California's
community property laws were in conflict with the federal Railroad Retirement Act which
vested ownership of railroad retirement benefits exclusively in the railroad employee
spouse. 439 U.S. at 590-91.
83. Worth, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 139.
84. Id.
85. Id. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 201(a), (d) (1988).
86. Worth, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 139.
87. Id.
88. Id. 17 U.S.C. § 301 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) states:
(a) On and after January 1, 1978, all legal or equitable rights that are equivalent
to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright as speci-
fied by section 106 in works of authorship that are fixed in a tangible medium
of expression and come within the subject matter of copyright as specified by
sections 102 and 103, whether created before or after that date and whether
published or unpublished, are governed exclusively by this title. Thereafter,
no person is entitled to any such right or equivalent right in any such work
under the common law or statutes of any State.
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Copyright Act. The court also rejected this argument, finding that
§ 301 reveals an intent by Congress to supersede only state copyright
laws. 89 The court suggested instead that a state law "will be pre-
empted only if the rights granted under state law are 'equivalent to
any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright as
specified by section 106. ' 9° The court noted that other state laws,
such as those governing breach of contract, conversion, and defama-
tion have not been preempted.91 The court concluded that "[r]ights of
ownership and division of marital property are in no way equivalent to
rights within the scope of copyright under the federal Copyright
Act"'92 and refused to invoke preemption under § 301.91
2. Supremacy Clause Preemption Argument
Because the language of the Supremacy Clause is clear and un-
ambiguous, it is remarkable that the California Court of Appeal in
Worth was not more troubled by its conclusion that California com-
munity property law is not preempted by federal copyright law. 94
Congress enacted the Copyright Act under its constitutional authority
to promote the arts by specifically securing for authors the exclusive
right to their writings.95 Because the Copyright Act is a valid exercise
of congressional power, it is a valid federal law and should preempt
any conflicting state law.
The Worth court ignored two facts in dismissing Frederick
Worth's reliance on Hisquierdo.96 First, it failed to recognize that
(b) Nothing in this title annuls or limits any rights or remedies under the com-
mon law or statutes of any State with respect to - (1) subject matter that
does not come within the subject matter of copyright as specified by sections
102 and 103, including works of authorship not fixed in any tangible medium
of expression; or (2) any cause of action arising from undertakings com-
menced before January 1, 1978; (3) activities violating legal or equitable
rights that are not equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general
scope of copyright as specified by section 106.
89. Worth, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 139.
90. Id. (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 301(a)).
91. Worth, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 139-40.
92. Id. at 140.
93. Id.
94. Nevins believes that "[clopyright is a form of property created by federal statute
and specifically authorized by the Constitution. There can be no doubt that Congress has
power under the Supremacy Clause to preclude state courts from dividing this or any other
federally created form of property between divorcing spouses." Nevins, supra note 51, at
383.
95. Congress has the power "[t]o Promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
96. See supra text accompanying notes 78-87, distinguishing Hisquierdo from Worth.
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Congress, in stating that a "[c]opyright in a work protected under this
title vests initially in the author or authors of the work,"97 expressly
designated a copyright as the separate property of the author. The
Copyright Act confers an exclusive property right at the time of crea-
tion of the rights in the author alone.
Second, the court incorrectly concluded that § 201(d) of the
Copyright Act, which allows ownership of a copyright to be trans-
ferred by operation of law, did not conflict with California community
property law. The Worth court ignored § 201(e), which precludes
transfer by operation of law unless the author has previously made a
voluntary transfer of the copyright.98 This was a crucial omission by
the court because Frederick Worth had not made a voluntary transfer
of his copyright prior to the transfer of ownership that took place
under California community property law. The court appears to have
hastily rejected Frederick Worth's preemption argument based on the
Supremacy Clause without careful consideration.
In addition, the court incorrectly concluded that Frederick
Worth's reliance on Hisquierdo and other related cases99 was mis-
placed. 1°° The court does not seem to have considered the reasoning
supporting preemption in these cases. In Hisquierdo the Supreme
Court concluded that classifying railroad retirement benefits as com-
munity property would threaten to penalize the railroad employee,
whom Congress had specifically sought to protect, and would frustrate
federal law.'0 1 In the Worth case federal law would also be frustrated,
and those whom Congress sought to protect would be penalized, if
state community property law were permitted to transfer copyright
ownership from the author spouse and vest it in both the author and
non-author spouses. The Copyright Clause of the Constitution guar-
antees an author the exclusive right to his writing for a specific period
of time.'02 The Copyright Act ensures that until the author has trans-
ferred his or her copyright voluntarily, no governmental body may
transfer or exercise rights of ownership.1"3 Hisquierdo cannot in fact
be clearly distinguished from Worth.
97. 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (1988).
98. David Nimmer suggests that an author domiciled in California might implicitly
consent to operation of California community property law, which works a transfer on
ownership of copyrights. Nimmer, supra note 4, at 407-15.
99. See supra note 81.
100. In re Marriage of Worth, 241 Cal. Rptr. 135, 139 (Ct. App. 1987).
101. Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 590 (1979).
102. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
103. 17 U.S.C. § 201(e) (1988). Note, however, that involuntary transfers provided for
under Title 11 dealing with bankruptcy will have effect.
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The cases related to Hisquierdo10 4 present other examples when
state community property law has been preempted by federal law.
Courts found state law preempted because application of state law
would threaten a comprehensive goal of Congress, °5 and when a state
law conflicts with a valid federal law, the Supremacy Clause compels
application of federal law. °6
It is clear from analyzing the Worth decision that congressional
goals of encouraging authorship and protecting authors' rights will be
threatened by the application of California community property law
to copyright ownership. The Supreme Court has invoked the
Supremacy Clause several times when it found congressional goals
threatened by the application of state law.' 7 In Wissner v. Wissner °8
the Court held that a serviceman's life insurance proceeds were his
separate property and that he had the right to designate the benefici-
ary of the policy, regardless of whether the premiums were paid with
community property funds.'09 The Court reasoned that the National
Service Life Insurance Act of 1940 was a way for Congress to provide
"a uniform and comprehensive system of life insurance for members
and veterans of the armed forces of the United States."" 0 The Court
found in the Act and the statutory plan a liberal policy toward the
serviceman and his ability to choose a beneficiary."' On that basis
104. See supra note 81.
105. Wissner v. wissner, 338 U.S. 655 (1950).
106. Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663 (1962).
107. Wissner, 338 U.S. at 655.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 658-59.
110. Id. at 658.
111. Id. In 1973 the United States Supreme Court in Goldstein v. California faced the
issue of whether a California state statute, which made it a criminal offense to pirate re-
cordings produced by others, should be preempted by federal copyright law. 412 U.S. 546,
551 (1973). The Court applied an analysis similar to that of Wissner but reached a different
conclusion. Id. at 555-60. The Goldstein Court found that a major goal of the copyright
clause was to provide national protection for writings. Id. at 555-57. However, instead of
concluding that the state statute should be preempted because it allowed for state protec-
tion in an area [sound recordings] that the federal copyright law had chosen not to protect,
the Court concluded that federal preemption was inappropriate. Id. at 558. The Court did
not recognize a conflict between state and federal law because it felt that some works were
of purely local importance and did not require national protection. Id. Thus, the Court
found that the federal interest in providing rights that were national in scope did not re-
quire a state to relinquish its power to grant copyright protection. Id. The Court saw
nothing expressly limiting copyright protection to the federal Copyright Act and preclud-
ing state legislation in the area. The Court implied that Congress had not spoken with the
clarity required to invoke preemption of federal law. Where "Congress determines that
neither federal protection nor freedom from restraint is required by the national interest, it
is at liberty to stay its hand entirely." Id. at 559. Professor Goldstein agrees: "Absent an
explicit federal command, states are free to protect subject matter that is not protected by
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the Court held that the insurance proceeds were not community prop-
erty because "Congress ha[d] spoken with force and clarity in di-
recting that the proceeds of the insurance belong to the named
beneficiary." ' 2
Just as the National Service Life Insurance Act was part of a com-
prehensive plan to enhance the morale of a serviceman by providing
him with insurance benefits, the Copyright Act and the statutory plan
behind it promote the overall goal of encouraging authorship and pro-
tecting authors. Just as applying state community property law to in-
surance benefits would dilute Congress' goal of enhancing morale,
transferring ownership from an author to a non-author spouse, as re-
quired by California community property law, is likely to serve as a
disincentive to create. The Worth court should have found that appli-
cation of state community property law to copyright ownership would
nullify federal law, just as the Supreme Court in Wissner held that
insurance benefits were not community property.113
the Copyright Act." 2 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT PRINCIPLES, LAW AND PRACTICE
§ 15.3.3 (1989).
Although the Court in Goldstein rejected the invocation of federal preemption based
solely on the need to satisfy a goal expressed by Congress, it implied a willingness to in-
voke federal preemption when the need to satisfy an articulated goal of Congress is cou-
pled with an express statement by Congress that a particular area is to be protected by
federal law. 412 U.S. at 561. Thus, it seems likely that if the United States Supreme Court
were presented with a situation similar to that of Worth, it would invoke preemption based
on (1) an articulated federal goal which is repugnant to state law, and (2) an express state-
ment by Congress that federal law is to occupy the area.
In Worth the California Court of Appeal was presented with an articulated federal
goal derived from the copyright clause of the Constitution, to encourage authorship and
protect authors by vesting them with the exclusive right to their works for a limited time.
This goal was coupled with an express statement by Congress that a copyright in a work
protected under the Copyright Act shall vest initially in the author or authors of the work.
17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (1988). Hence, under the analysis applied in Goldstein it seems likely
that state community property law would be found preempted by federal copyright law.
112. Wissner, 338 U.S. at 655, 658.
113. Id. at 655. See also McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210 (1981). In McCarty the
Supreme Court considered whether community property principles could be applied to
military retirement pay. The Supreme Court held that federal law precludes a state court
from dividing military retirement pay pursuant to state community property laws. Id. at
236. The McCarty Court found a conflict between state community property law, id. at
232, because the federal military retirement system confers no entitlement to a spouse of a
retired military employee. Id. at 235. The Supreme Court found that the application of
community property principles to military retirement pay would threaten "grave harm to
'clear and substantial' federal interests." Id. at 232. The Supreme Court reasoned that
congressional goals would be frustrated if community property principles were applied to
retirement pay, because the amount of pay Congress had determined necessary for the
retired employee would be reduced. This reduction in pay upon retirement might interfere
with Congress' ability to induce people to enlist and its ability to encourage people to
retire. This would then frustrate Congress' ability to encourage orderly promotion and to
keep the military youthful.
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The Supreme Court has also preempted state law in situations
when the Supremacy Clause compelled such a ruling. The Supremacy
Clause compels the application of federal law if a valid federal law
exists and there is a conflict between that federal law and a state
law." 4 The federal law at issue, the Copyright Act, is a valid federal
law which vests ownership of copyright initially in the author only.
California community property law conflicts with the Copyright Act
by vesting ownership of copyright in both author and non-author
spouses, while federal copyright law vests ownership in the author
only. This is a clear conflict between state and federal law. The
Supremacy Clause therefore compels application of federal copyright
law over state community property law.
Worth ignored the need to protect a comprehensive goal of Con-
gress, which would be threatened if state law were applied. Worth
also failed to recognize that in this case the Supremacy Clause com-
pels application of federal copyright law.115
In 1983 McCarty was overruled by statute when Congress enacted the Uniformed
Services Former Spouses' Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 97-252, § 1002, 96 Stat. 730 (1982)
(codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. § 1408 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)), to permit a state court to
treat military retirement pay as individual or joint property according to state law. Olson
v. Olson, 445 N.W.2d 1, 8 (N.D. 1989).
Bullock v. Bullock, 354 N.W.2d 904 (N.D. 1984), discussed Congress' enactment of the
Uniformed Services Former Spouses' Protection Act which became effective February 1,
1983. It stated that "a court may treat disposable retired or retainer pay payable to a
member for pay periods beginning after June 25, 1981, either as property solely of the
member or as property of the member and his spouse in accordance with the law of the
jurisdiction of such court." Id. at 907 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 749, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 165
(1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1569, 1570). The court in Bullock stated that the
provision was intended to remove the federal preemption found by the United States
Supreme Court in McCarty v. McCarty, and to permit state and other courts to apply state
law in determining whether military retirement pay should be divisible. Id. Please note
that nothing in the Uniformed Services Former Spouses' Protection Act requires division;
the issue is left open to the courts.
114. Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663, 666 (1962). In Free the Supreme Court held Treasury
Regulations were to be applied to United States savings bonds, not Texas community prop-
erty law. Id. at 670. This meant that the right of survivorship applied to bonds which were
taken in the name of husband or wife, regardless of whether community property funds
were used to purchase the bonds. Id. The Court used the two-prong inquiry to determine
if the Supremacy Clause had been triggered. Id. at 666. The Court also considered the
purpose of the regulations set by the Treasury.
115. If Worth were before the Supreme Court today, based on Bonito Boats, Inc. v.
Thunder Craft Boats Inc., 489 U.S. 141 (1989), the Court would probably find state law
preempted. In Bonito Boats a unanimous Court held that a Florida statute prohibiting the
use of a direct molding process to duplicate unpatented boat hulls was preempted by fed-
eral patent law under the Supremacy Clause. Id. at 144. The Court reasoned that the
federal policy of encouraging invention, while at the same time allowing for free competi-
tion in unpatented ideas, was undermined by the Florida statute, which it found to extend
state patent protection to an idea which was unpatented or unpatentable under federal law.
Id. at 151. The Court found that the federal patent system balances the need to encourage
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3. Section 301 Preemption Argument
Frederick Worth also argued for preemption based on § 301 of
the Copyright Act.1 16 The court found that rights of ownership and
division of marital property were not equivalent to the rights under
the federal Copyright Act.117 Under § 301, no person is entitled to
any right under the common law or any state statute if that right is
equivalent to a particular right found in the Copyright Act. This
means that any state right that is determined by a court to be
"equivalent" to any of the federally created exclusive rights under
§ 106 of the Copyright Act must be preempted. Thus if the work at
issue falls within the definition of copyrightable subject matter1 18 and
the right created under state or common law is equivalent to a right
granted under § 106 of the Copyright Act, then federal law will trump
state law, and preemption will be invoked. 119
creation and disclosure of "new, useful, and non-obvious advances in technology and de-
sign" with the exclusive right of the inventor to practice the invention for a limited dura-
tion. Id. at 150-51. The offer of federal protection from competitive exploitation of
intellectual property would be rendered meaningless if substantially similar state law pro-
tections were available. Id. Federal patent laws must determine not only what is pro-
tected, but also what is free for all to use, so as to not render federal protection obsolete.
Id. at 151. "[T]hrough the creation of patent-like rights, the States could essentially redi-
rect inventive efforts away from the careful criteria of patentability developed by Congress
over the last 200 years." Id. at 157. In addition, national uniformity, one of the central
purposes behind the patent and copyright clauses of the Constitution, is frustrated by a
state statute which affords protection for ideas which would not be protected under the
federal law. Id. at 162. States are not free to offer equivalent protections to ideas "which
Congress has determined should belong to all." Id. at 164-65. The Florida statute disturbs
the balance between federal patent policy and free competition by restricting the public's
ability to exploit ideas that the patent system mandates shall be free for all to use. Id. at
167.
Applying the reasoning in Bonito Boats to the facts of Worth, preemption of state
community property law is necessary since fundamental goals of the Constitution, those of
fostering incentive for authors to create and enabling national uniformity, are frustrated.
California community property law protects the property right of the non-author spouse by
vesting both spouses with co-ownership of the copyright. This directly conflicts with fed-
eral law, which states that the author of a work has certain exclusive rights for a period of
time. In addition, one of the fundamental purposes behind the Copyright Clause was to
ensure national uniformity. California community property law restricts national uniform-
ity by establishing rules of ownership which apply in only one state.
California community property law undermines federal copyright law by vesting own-
ership in the author and non-author spouses and allowing shared ownership and manage-
ment of the copyright. Federal copyright law expressly vests title in the author and gives
him, exclusively, the rights of exploitation. Federal protection for the author under the
Copyright Act is meaningless if state law can operate to vest ownership in the author and
the non-author spouse.
116. 17 U.S.C. § 301 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). See supra note 88.
117. In re Marriage of Worth, 241 Cal. Rptr. 135, 139-40 (Ct. App. 1987).
118. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103 (1988).
119. Id. § 106. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
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The Worth court did not apply the two step preemption analysis
prescribed by § 301 in order to determine whether California commu-
nity property law should have been preempted. Instead, the court in-
correctly interpreted § 301 as dictating that only state copyright laws
could be preempted. 120 The Worth court supported its conclusion by
considering other state rights, such as breach of contract, conversion,
and defamation, that were not preempted. 121 The court reasoned that
community property laws dealing with ownership, management, and
division of marital property were at issue, not state copyright laws;
therefore, there could be no preemption. 122
If the analysis in § 301 had been applied, the court would have
concluded that preemption was necessary. First, the trivia books at
issue in Worth fell within the definition of copyrightable subject mat-
ter.123 The books, depending on their content, could have been classi-
fied either as original literary works or as compilations, fixed in a
tangible medium of expression, from which they could be perceived,
reproduced, or communicated. 124 Thus, because the books fit within
the subject matter of copyright, the first prong of the § 301 preemp-
tion inquiry would have been satisfied.
The second prong of the inquiry requires a finding that a state or
common law right is equivalent to one of the rights established under
§ 106 of the Copyright Act.1 25 The House Judiciary Committee report
on § 301 states that all state laws that grant rights corresponding to
rights created under § 106 are preempted and asserts that "corre-
120. Worth, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 139-40.
121. Id. at 138. The version of § 301 reported out of the House and Senate Committees
expressly stated that certain rights against misappropriation, breaches of contract, breaches
of trust, trespass, conversion, invasion of privacy, defamation, and deceptive trade prac-
tices were not equivalent to the exclusive rights designated under § 106 of the Copyright
Act. ABRAMS, supra note 11, § 6.03[C][1], at 6-38. As Abrams notes, the list of rights was
intended to illustrate rights and remedies that are different in nature from the § 106 rights
in the Copyright Act and that are not preempted by federal law but may continue to be
protected under state common law or statute. Id. This list was deleted when § 301 was
enacted.
122. Worth, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 139-40.
123. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103 (1988).
124. See id. § 102.
125. See id. § 106 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). "This seemingly straightforward inquiry into
whether a claimed right under state law is equivalent to the five rights listed in § 106 of the
Copyright Act has become a problem of significant, and perhaps unnecessary, complexity."
ABRAMS, supra note 11, § 6.03[C], at 6-36. "Frequently, the courts have adopted a method
suggested by language in the Committee Reports which uses identity of elements of proof
as the test of whether rights are equivalent." Id. § 6.03[C], at 6-37. Case law has referred
to this method as the "extra element test." Abrams suggests that this method is illogical
and that it leads to erroneous results. Id.
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sponding" rights are not necessarily identical rights. 126 Under the Ju-
diciary Committee interpretation of § 301, state law governing
management rights of community property need not be identical to
rights under § 106 if they correspond to, and affect the exercise of,
exclusive rights under that section.
One inquiry used by courts to determine whether a state or com-
mon law right is equivalent to one of the rights established under
§ 106 of the Copyright Act is whether the state law "creates, grants, or
destroys any rights that are 'equivalent' to the exclusive rights"
granted in § 106.127
This means that a state statute which creates rights that can be
violated by the exercise of any § 106 right would be preempted by the
federal statute. California community property law creates ownership
and management rights which allow either the author spouse or non-
author spouse to make an exclusive license granting the right to
reproduce the work, prepare derivative works based on the work, dis-
tribute the work, publicly perform the work, or publicly display the
work. This violates the Copyright Act by giving the non-author
spouse rights not created by the Copyright Act. Under federal copy-
right law, for example, an author's § 106 rights would be violated if a
non-author spouse were permitted to license that work, because fed-
eral copyright law vests ownership in the author of an original work
fixed in a tangible medium and § 106 grants exclusive rights to the
author alone. California community property law, on the other hand,
creates ownership rights for a non-author and grants that non-author
§ 106 rights. Federal preemption of California community property
laws involving copyright is warranted under this equivalent right test.
Another test used by courts to determine whether state rights are
equivalent to rights granted under § 106 is the "extra element" test.
128
Under this test, a state claim will not be preempted by the Copyright
Act if it contains an extra element that qualitatively distinguishes the
state action and the underlying rights asserted from those granted
under § 106.129 The extra element must therefore change the nature
of the action in a manner which makes it fundamentally different from
a copyright infringement claim. 3 °
126. Patrick McNamara, Note, Copyright Preemption: Effecting the Analysis Prescribed
by Section 301, 24 B.C. L. REV. 963, 983 (1983).
127. Allied Artists Pictures Corp. v. Rhodes, 496 F. Supp. 408, 443 (S.D. Ohio 1980).
128. ABRAMS, supra note 11, § 6.03[C][11, at 6-40.
129. Id. See, e.g., Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539
(1985).
130. LEAFFER, supra note 9, § 11.7, at 335.
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To apply the extra element test to the action in Worth, it is neces-
sary to characterize the type of action that Susan Worth initially
brought in Superior Court. Worth involved an appeal by author Fred-
erick Worth of an order granting his ex-wife half of all royalties re-
ceived from the exploitation of his two trivia books, in addition to any
proceeds from Frederick Worth's lawsuit for copyright infringe-
ment.13 ' The action was one for a classification and division of the
property at issue, as well as for an accounting of all profits and royal-
ties received from such property. The question then becomes whether
these claims involved rights similar to the § 106 rights granted to an
author under the Copyright Act, or whether these claims contained
elements which made them fundamentally different from a copyright
infringement claim.
Claims for classification and division of marital property, as well
as for an accounting, are fundamentally different from a copyright in-
fringement claim. An infringement claim requires that a third party
violate "one or more of the copyright owner's exclusive rights as enu-
merated under section 106 of the [Copyright Act];"'1 32 the other claims
do not have this requirement. Also, an action for classification and
division of marital property presumes the existence of a community,
which implies that the parties to the action have been married. The
element of marriage that is required for a classification and division
claim seems to be an extra element when compared with the elements
necessary to bring a copyright infringement claim.133 It seems, then,
that the court could have found the claims in Worth fundamentally
different from a copyright infringement claim and could have con-
cluded that California community property law was not preempted by
the federal Copyright Act.
Because the Worth case did not involve the violation of any § 106
rights, which trigger a claim for copyright infringement, it seems
highly unlikely that California community property law would have
sought to protect any of those rights in this instance. On the other
hand, because the claims in Worth were fundamentally different than
a § 106 claim,13 1 the extra element test was arguably misplaced.
131. In re Marriage of Worth, 241 Cal. Rptr. 135, 135 (Ct. App. 1987).
132. LEAFFER, supra note 9, § 9.1, at 265. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 10, § 6.10, at
6-27.
133. The copyright owner must prove ownership of a valid copyright in the work and
copying of that work by the defendant. LEAFFER, supra note 9, § 9.2, at 265. See Marshall
Leaffer's discussion on infringement. Id. § 9.
134. See, e.g., Mountain State Properties, Inc. v. Robinson, 771 P.2d 5 (Colo. Ct. App.
1988) (action seeking an accounting of profits from a joint owner of a co-authored work
was not an action for copyright infringement that belongs in federal court).
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In determining whether California community property law
should have been preempted under § 301 of the Copyright Act the
Worth court ignored: (1) the two-step preemption analysis prescribed
by § 301 of the Copyright Act; (2) the conflict between federal copy-
right law and state community property law, which both grant rights
of ownership and management; (3) that these corresponding rights
suggest that California community property law should be preempted
in favor of the Copyright Act; and (4) that California community
property law impermissibly restricts an author's exclusive right, as
copyright owner, to exercise the rights granted by § 106. These factors
which were ignored by the Worth court, suggest that under § 301 of
the Copyright Act, California community property law should have
been preempted. Although under the extra element test it might ap-
pear that preemption should not be invoked, the test seems misplaced
where the rights of action are fundamentally different than the rights
granted to an author under § 106 of the Copyright Act.
4. Section 201(e)-The Forgotten Preemption Argument' 35
Frederick Worth might have made a more convincing argument
for preemption based on § 201(e) of the Copyright Act. 13 6 This sec-
tion provides that if an author has not transferred a copyright, no ac-
tion by any governmental body transferring ownership rights will be
given effect.'37 Under the Copyright Act, ownership vests initially in
the author. 138  California community property law automatically
transfers the author's copyright to both the author and spouse, as co-
owners, without voluntary transfer by the author. 39 Since the appli-
cation of state law directly conflicts with federal law, § 201(e) pre-
cludes giving effect to California community property law.
Admittedly, the decision to marry in California arguably estab-
lishes consent to California community property law and its effects on
the ownership, management, and division of copyright. 140 Absent
135. Howard B. Abrams suggests in his treatise LAW OF COPYRIGHT that there can be
preemption under § 201 of the Copyright Act as well as under § 301. According to
Abrams, the Worth court failed to consider the issue of whether a forced transfer of
ownership in a copyright by virtue of community property principles was prohibited under
§ 201(e). ABRAMS, supra note 11, § 6.04[C], at 6-55.
136. 17 U.S.C. § 201(e) (1988). See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
137. 17 U.S.C. § 201(e).
138. Id. § 201(a).
139. This is the resulting effect of CAL. FAM. CODE § 760 on property acquired during
marriage.
140. Nimmer argues that "application of community property laws to copyrighted
works stands or falls based on whether married authors have at least implicitly consented
to transfers of their works" by a decision to marry. Nimmer, supra note 4, at 409.
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such consent, however, the Worth court should not have rejected the
state law preemption arguments. 141 Because California community
property law acts to automatically transfer exclusive copyright owner-
ship from the author spouse, it falls squarely within § 201(e) and
would "clearly" be preempted. 142 Furthermore, Patry states "section
201(e)'s extension to domestic actions .. .[disables any court] from
awarding to a non-author spouse interests in his or her author
spouse's copyright involuntarily, for the award as an enforceable state
action would work an involuntary transfer within the meaning of
§ 201(e). ' ' 43
The foregoing analysis, considering whether California commu-
nity property law should be preempted by the Supremacy Clause 144 or
by the statutory provision in the federal Copyright Act (under § 301,
which deals expressly with preemption, or § 201(e), which by its lan-
guage preempts transfer by operation of California community prop-
erty law), arguably establishes that the Worth court erred in upholding
the application of state law. Under the court's § 301 analysis, how-
ever, it is unclear whether the court correctly rejected preemption.
Courts have not strictly followed a standard § 301 analysis; some look
to § 301, some ignore § 301 and focus on the Supremacy Clause, while
others consider the Supremacy Clause as well as § 301.'45 Without a
standard method of analysis, it is difficult to determine how a court
should hold.
E. Future Problems Might Result Because of the Worth Decision
Because the Worth court quickly dismissed any inconsistencies
that existed between copyright and community property law, it
avoided many important issues that will continue to face California
courts. If courts are to determine the status of a California author's
original work,146 they must confront the sources, realize the differ-




143. Patry, supra note 69, at 267.
144. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
145. See McNamara's article suggesting a "basis test" for a preemption analysis under
§ 301 that (1) compares federal and state rights; (2) determines the reasons for the passage
of state law; (3) examines the effect on federal copyright laws; and (4) assesses the signifi-
cance of that effect. McNamara, supra note 126, at 1006-10.
146. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1988).
147. Copyright seeks to encourage authorship and foster incentive to create. U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. Federal copyright law also seeks to establish a single national
standard for copyright exchange. Community property law seeks to recognize in economic
terms the contributions of non-earning spouses. Roberts, supra note 6, at 1059.
[Vol. 17:601
COPYRIGHT AS COMMUNITY PROPERTY
California courts should reconsider the Worth decision. Worth
omitted at least four considerations from its analysis. Because of
these omissions, the Worth decision failed to balance the rights of an
author's spouse with an author's ability to effectively exploit owner-
ship rights in a creative work. 48
First, the court dismissed, with little hesitation or analysis, the in-
vocation of preemption.149 The court rejected preemption grounded
in the Supremacy Clause as well as § 301 of the Copyright Act. Fur-
ther, the court failed to consider § 201(e) and whether that section
prevented the transfer of copyright by operation of California commu-
nity property law. The court seems to have been primarily interested
in protecting the power of the state to control the division of intellec-
tual property. Unfortunately, the court rejected federal preemption at
the expense of an author's rights.
Second, the court hastily concluded that a legal education was
analytically distinguishable from a copyright. This is significant be-
cause this distinction allowed the court to find a copyright to be a
community property asset.
Third, the court left unclear whether transfers of community
property copyrights are to be governed by California community
property law or federal copyright law. 150 The two laws present differ-
ing standards for the transfer of copyright. 151 The court's failure to
define the transfer standard places buyers of copyright interests in a
precarious position; they cannot be certain that a transfer is valid un-
less both federal and state standards are met.152 Under both federal
copyright and California community property law, a single co-owner
can convey a nonexclusive license without the consent of the other co-
owner.'53 Under the federal copyright standard, both co-owners must
agree to execute an exclusive license. No exclusive transfer executed
by an author spouse is valid without the signature of the non-author
148. Nimmer, supra note 4, at 412.
149. According to Nevins, "[t]he Court's pre-emption analysis, if turned in by a law
student on an examination, would hardly merit a D." Nevins, supra note 51, at 398.
150. Roberts agrees that the Worth court did not address the appropriate standard for
copyright transfers. Roberts, supra note 6, at 1054-55.
151. The standards are based on the concept of joint ownership under copyright law
versus joint ownership under California community property law.
152. The possibility of invalid transfer is always a risk for the transferee. Usually, a
covenant in the contract to convey warrants that the transferor has ownership of the rights
it purports to convey and that he will indemnify the transferee in the event that he is found
not to have valid ownership. The uncertainty of the standard to be applied merely in-
creases the burden on the transferee. For example, marriage affects the disposition of the
transferor's property. Roberts, supra note 6, at 1055.
153. CAL. FAM. CODE § 1100 (Deering 1994). Without the consent of other co-owners,
a co-owner can only issue non-exclusive licenses. ABRAMS, supra note 11, § 4.03[BI[4].
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spouse. The transferee must find out whether the author was married
at the time of creation of the work to determine what signatures are
required.
Under California community property law, either co-owner can
execute an exclusive license.154 This means that a non-author spouse
can grant an exclusive license without an author's knowledge or con-
sent, as long as the transfer is made for fair and reasonable value.155 If
the California community property standard is used, purchasers of
copyright interests must be concerned with the "sale-out-from-under
problem." 56 This occurs when the non-author spouse executes an ex-
clusive license, rendering the author spouse powerless to transfer any
rights in the work. The federal copyright scheme avoids this problem
because the non-author spouse must have the signature of the author
spouse to grant an exclusive license.1 57
The Worth decision will have far reaching effects. It will affect
not only husband and wife upon dissolution, but might place the en-
tertainment industry, which needs to license copyrighted works, in the
frustrating and burdensome position of having to find out if the per-
son licensing a work is married, is domiciled in California, has primary
management and control of the copyright "business," created the
work during a marriage, and has previously granted an exclusive li-
cense in the work to another party (and whether a spouse has previ-
ously granted such a license).158 In an industry where performance
between parties often takes place before a contract is written, apply-
ing California community property law will likely increase litigation
between the entertainment industry and third-party claimants.
IV
Proposed Resolution
The Worth court's holding that federal law does not preempt Cal-
ifornia community property law nullifies an author's exclusive rights
granted under the Copyright Act by giving the non-author spouse co-
ownership of the copyright and equal management and control of the
rights flowing from copyright ownership. Moreover, if upon dissolu-
tion the copyright is not awarded to the author, sold, or made subject
to division, the non-author spouse continues to have rights even when
154. CAL. FAM. CODE § 1100.
155. Id.
156. Roberts, supra note 6, at 1055.
157. Under copyright law, one co-owner must have the written consent of the other co-
owner to make an exclusive license. 17 U.S.C. § 204(a).
158. Perlstein raises the first four issues also. Peristein, supra note 5, at 7.
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estranged from the author. These rights include an equal share of all
royalties derived from the exploitation of the work.'
59
Formulating an alternative resolution to Worth requires re-evalu-
ating the goals of community property and copyright law. California
community property law seeks to protect a non-earning spouse by rec-
ognizing, in economic terms, the contribution of the non-earning
spouse.160 Federal copyright law seeks to provide incentive for au-
thors to create by providing an author with ownership and other ex-
clusive rights. The Worth court's treatment of copyright ownership as
community property frustrates the goals of copyright law without sub-
stantially furthering the goals of community property law.1 6 1 An al-
ternative to Worth must more equitably balance the competing
interests of community property law and copyright law.
A. Asset Distribution upon Dissolution
The Worth court stated that "[a] copyright, has a present value
based on the ascertainable value of the underlying work."' 62 As-
signing a present value to a copyright would allow asset distribution
upon dissolution. Under an asset distribution scheme, the author
spouse would be entitled to the copyright, and the non-author spouse
would be awarded other real or personal community property of
equal value. An equalizing payment would be made if necessary.
In the Worth case if Frederick Worth and Susan Worth had
agreed to asset distribution at the time of dissolution, Frederick Worth
could have gained exclusive control over his copyrights and they
would have become his separate property. Susan Worth would have
been compensated with other community property assets and as a re-
sult of their agreement would have been entitled to one-half of all
royalties from the books, in perpetuity. 63 Susan Worth would not
have been entitled, however, to any proceeds from an infringement
suit, since that money would have been a product of property which
no longer belonged to the community. 64
159. Frederick and Susan Worth agreed to an equal division of royalties from the two
trivia books. In re Marriage of Worth, 241 Cal. Rptr. 135, 135. (Ct. App. 1987).
160. Traditionally, California community property law sought to protect the non-earn-
ing spouse, who was seen as contributing to the community in other ways, such as taking
care of children, cooking, cleaning, etc. Despite its traditional purpose, California commu-
nity property law operates regardless of the employment status of either spouse.
161. Roberts, supra note 6, at 1062.
162. Worth, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 138.
163. Id. at 137.
164. CAL. FAM. CODE § 771 (Deering 1994).
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Asset distribution opens up the possibility of allowing an author
to regain control over his creative work, and the exploitation of that
work, after dissolution. In reality, asset distribution would probably
result in an author spouse maintaining rather than regaining control,
because a non-author spouse is less likely to exercise the equal man-
agement and control rights allowed by community property law. It
should not matter how property is characterized during marriage in a
community property state; dissolution or death trigger the effects of
characterization. 165
Because the Worth case arose out of a dissolution, this proposed
resolution considers only the termination of the community upon dis-
solution. During marriage, a non-author spouse, by virtue of commu-
nity property principles, has co-ownership of a copyright acquired
during marriage, may exercise equal management and control over
that copyright, and may grant an exclusive or non-exclusive license of
that work without the consent of the author spouse. 166 An asset distri-
bution scheme can operate only upon dissolution to allow an author
spouse to maintain ownership of copyright interests and to provide
incentives for an author to create works and make them available to
the public. Because a copyright has a present value, distributing assets
upon dissolution protects the author spouse and benefits the non-
earning spouse economically by dividing the community assets
equally.
B. Limitation on Length of Time a Non-Author Can Receive Royalties
Even though Frederick Worth and Susan Worth agreed to equally
divide all royalties from the two trivia books in perpetuity, the Worth
court would probably have made the same division of royalties even
without an explicit agreement, based on its characterization of the
copyright as community property.
Despite this classification, an author will often rewrite or exploit
the work in some manner after dissolution. Earnings from efforts
made after dissolution of marriage do not belong to the community.
Royalties derived from efforts made after marriage, therefore, are the
separate property of the author spouse. Awarding the non-author
spouse half of all royalties to be derived in perpetuity runs counter to
the separate property character of earnings acquired after marriage.
The efforts that an author will expend after dissolution to exploit a
copyright are not efforts for which the nonexistent community should
165. Patry, supra note 69, at 238.
166. CAL. FAM. CODE § 1100.
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be compensated. Rather, a non-author spouse's royalties should be
based on the specific exploitation which occurred during the
marriage. 167
C. Author and Non-Author Spouse Can Contract Around the Law
An author wishing to protect a copyright interest should enter
into a pre-nuptial or post-nuptial agreement specifying the disposition
of any copyrights upon dissolution. An author and non-author spouse
may agree on division of copyrights and royalties and on the propor-
tion and duration of any division. Ultimately, the division of copy-
right ownership upon dissolution is most appropriately handled by the
legislatures and courts, but until the issue is resolved, providing for
asset distribution on dissolution with a limitation on the term of royal-




Vesting ownership of a copyright in the non-author as well as the
author spouse under California community property law deprives an
author of the exclusive rights granted under the federal Copyright
Act. Depriving an author of federally created rights provides a disin-
centive to create. Classifying a copyright as a community property
asset therefore frustrates the goals of federal copyright law.
Community property law also affects the transfer standard for
copyrights by leaving transfer requirements unclear. The resulting un-
certainty affects a purchaser of intellectual property rights and an au-
thor seeking to exploit a copyrighted work. Additionally, community
property law also affects the choices an author can make regarding the
exploitation of his or her work when a non-author spouse is a co-
owner with rights to license an author spouse's copyrighted work on
an exclusive or non-exclusive basis.
Because California community property law arguably frustrates
federal objectives, and conflicts with federal copyright law, state law
should be preempted. The Worth court rejected preemption argu-
ments, allowing state law to continue interfering with rights and inter-
ests granted to an author by federal law. California courts should re-
167. Patry asserts that royalties received during separation would be separate property
regardless of whether they were community property during marriage. Patry, supra note
69, at 244.
168. Perlstein, supra note 5, at 10. Perlstein offers other solutions for dealing with the
equal division of copyrights. Id.
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examine the Worth holding and strike a more equitable balance be-
tween the competing interests of copyright and California community
property law. 169
169. Nimmer, supra note 4, at 412:
[Tihe goal must be to preserve the rights of authors' spouses while not impinging
on the authors' ability effectively to exploit their copyrights. Any scheme that
lessens the possibility of such exploitation not only harms both the author and the
non-author spouse, but also undermines Congress' purpose in enacting the copy-
right laws: to encourage authorship. This factor militates once again towards
preemption.
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